Excerpt of IAEA report on Fukushima nuclear crisis

IAEA team of experts went on a fact finding mission in the Tohoku region from May 24 - June 1, 2011.

What is interesting is that IAEA team not only visited Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, but also other nuclear power plants (Tokai, Higashi Dori, Onagawa and Fukushima Dai-ni) hit by the massive earthquake and large tsunami waves. Although the large tsunami waves affected all these facilities to varying degrees, TEPCO`s Fukushima Dai-ichi came out as the one with the most severe consequences.

So, what happened at TEPCO's Fukushima Dai-ichi?

Although all electrical power was lost when the earthquake occurred, the automatic systems successfully inserted all the control rods into its three operational reactors 1-3. In addition, all available emergency diesel generator power systems were in operation.

However, the 14-meter high tsunami waves washed away all power sources except for one emergency diesel generator that provided emergency power to be shared between reactors 5 and 6. Without power, reactor control or instrumentation on site, the TEPCO operators also had problems with communications systems both within and external to the site.

Without the cooling systems for the reactors, Units 1-3 quickly heated up due to usual reactor decay heating. The rest is history.

Here is an excerpt of the report:

"1. The Japanese Government, nuclear regulators and operators have been extremely open in sharing information and answering the many questions of the mission to assist the world in learning lessons to improve nuclear safety.

2. The response on the site by dedicated, determined and expert staff, under extremely arduous conditions has been exemplary and resulted in the best approach to securing safety given the exceptional circumstances. This has been greatly assisted by highly professional back-up support, especially the arrangements at J-Village to secure the protection of workers going on sites.

3. The Japanese Government's longer term response to protect the public, including evacuation, has been impressive and extremely well organized. A suitable and timely follow-up programme on public and worker exposures and health monitoring would be beneficial.

4. The planned road-map for recovery of the stricken reactors is important and acknowledged. It will need modification as new circumstances are uncovered
and may be assisted by international co-operation. It should be seen as part of a wider plan that could result in remediation of the areas off site affected by radioactive releases to allow people evacuated to resume their normal lives. Thus demonstrating to the world what can be achieved in responding to such extreme nuclear events.

5. The tsunami hazard for several sites was underestimated. Nuclear designers and operators should appropriately evaluate and provide protection against the risks of all natural hazards, and should periodically update these assessments and assessment methodologies in light of new information, experience and understanding.

6. Defence in depth, physical separation, diversity and redundancy requirements should be applied for extreme external events, particularly those with common mode implications such as extreme floods.

7. Nuclear regulatory systems should address extreme external events adequately, including their periodic review, and should ensure that regulatory independence and clarity of roles are preserved in all circumstances in line with IAEA Safety Standards.

8. Severe long term combinations of external events should be adequately covered in design, operations, resourcing and emergency arrangements.

9. The Japanese accident demonstrates the value of hardened on-site Emergency Response Centres with adequate provisions for communications, essential plant parameters, control and resources. They should be provided for all major nuclear facilities with severe accident potential. Additionally, simple effective robust equipment should be available to restore essential safety functions in a timely way for severe accident conditions.

10. Hydrogen risks should be subject to detailed evaluation and necessary mitigation systems provided.

11. Emergency arrangements, especially for the early phases, should be designed to be robust in responding to severe accidents."

The IAEA report covers both the good and bad points of Japan's nuclear crisis.

Japan earns good marks (nos. 1-4) in terms of dealing with orderly evacuation of the affected people in the devastated area and the efforts of the TEPCO operators who are dedicated and determined to tackle the nuclear crisis.

Japan earns bad marks for poor planning of the nuclear power plant sites (nos. 5 & 8), lacking adequate emergency arrangements for severe accidents (nos. 6,9,11), and the cozy relationship between the Nuclear regulatory systems with the nuclear power companies (no. 7), not following the line of IAEA Safety Standards.

In reality, the report doesn't help to contain the nuclear crisis, but to reiterate what is already well known about the deficiency, inadequacy and inefficiency of TEPCO, along with the government nuclear agency, in dealing with the pressing nuclear disaster. What IAEA needs to provide is a sensible road to control and contain the nuclear crisis, which we haven't seen yet.

Under closer scrutiny, the report doesn't address the poor crisis management that we are witnessing today at Fukushima power plant - unmanageable tons of radioactive water at the site, continuation of radiation leaks from the facilities, and the worsening of the nuclear crisis.

Japan: Political Power-Wrangling in the Face of Nuclear Crisis

On June 2, 2011, a no-confidence motion against the Cabinet of Prime Minister Naoto Kan failed in the Lower House. Though Kan needed only 232 votes, an overwhelming majority of 293 lawmakers supported him by voting against the motion compared with 152 who voted in favor.

The no-confidence motion submitted by the opposition Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), New Komeito and the Sunrise Party of Japan, was aimed at toppling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Kan's government. They banked on Kan's own political party's bloc headed by Ichiro Ozawa, the former head of Japan's ruling party who's been indicted for illegal political fund-raising, to succeed in their quest to splinter the DPJ as a way to gain political points. If the no-confidence motion in the Lower House had passed, then Kan Cabinet would have to either resign en masse or Kan would have to dissolve the Lower House for a snap election.

It appears just before the plenary session to vote on the no-confidence motion Kan defused the rebellion among the DPJ members with a promise to step down once the Tohoku crisis is under control. For all the media attention focused on Ozawa's power-play to topple Kan, Ozawa himself didn't even show up to vote on the no-confidence motion.

The LDP, the largest opposition to DPJ, attacked Kan for handling the nuclear crisis, even though LDP was responsible for the lax oversight of the nuclear-power industry during its 50 years in power. Not surprisingly, Tokyo Electric Power (TEPCO) has been one of the big donors to the LDP. The timing of the no-confidence vote could be linked to Kan's recent calls to deregulate the energy industry, scale down the importance of nuclear power, and consider renewable energy sources for the future.

In reality, everyone loses. Despite Kan's obvious defeat of the opposition parties and Ozawa, the political diversion of no-confidence motion has set the stage for his lame-duck rule in the midst of a national emergency. Diet deliberations on important bills to handle the national crisis may be delayed because greater attention is focused on picking Kan's successor.

Most Japanese, especially disaster victims who have lost homes, jobs and loved ones, and are facing ongoing threats of radioactive contamination, have been very critical of the politicians - expressing anger and confusion over the timing of the no-confidence motion.

In the Tohoku region, many voting sites and ballot counting locations were completely destroyed or washed away in the tsunami. How could they have elections if the Lower House was dissolved?

Furthermore, no unified view within the LDP of what form the new government should be if they succeeded in pushing out Kan's administration.

When will the Japanese politicians stop thinking of themselves and start thinking of the people they represent for a change?